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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44345
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2014-6665
v. )
)
SAMARI PRENTICE WINN, ) APPELLANT’S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury found Samari Prentice Winn guilty of two counts of aiding and abetting first
degree murder and one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder. The district
court imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment, with forty years fixed. Mr. Winn
timely appealed. On appeal, he contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence.
2Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On May 8, 2014, Travontae Calloway, Elliott Bailey, and Jeanette Juraska were shot in
Mr. Calloway and Ms. Juraska’s residence in Boise, Idaho. (Tr., p.400, L.10–p.401, L.1, p.418,
L.5–p.426, L.17.) According Ms. Juraska, she had opened the door of their house, expecting a
pizza delivery, but instead Mr. Winn was at the door. (Tr., p.418, Ls.5–10, p.419, Ls.2–10,
p.462, Ls.12–21.) She testified that another man almost instantaneously pushed past Mr. Winn
and shot her, Mr. Calloway, and Mr. Bailey. (Tr., p.418, Ls.15–21, p.420, Ls.15–23, p.464, Ls.9–
12.) Mr. Calloway and Mr. Bailey died from their gunshot wounds; Ms. Juraska survived.
(Tr., p.428, L.17–p.429, L.3, p.651, L.10–p.655, L.15.) Eventually, the police identified John
Douglas as the shooter and Anthony Robins as the getaway driver. (Tr., p.437, Ls.2–8, p.690,
L.22–p.692, L.8, p.921, L.11–p.924, L.18, p.926, L.24–p.927, L.2.) A fourth individual, Anton
Raider, testified that he provided the gun, bullets, and getaway vehicle. (Tr., p.902, Ls.1–21,
p.904, L.1–p.905, L.8, p.909, L.14–p.913, L.10, p.922, Ls.3–18.) The police determined the
motive for the shooting was drug-related: Mr. Raider told the police that Mr. Robins believed
Mr. Calloway and Mr. Bailey had stolen thirty pounds of marijuana from him in October of
2013. (Tr., p.889, Ls.2–16, p.893, L.5–p.900, L.21, p.916, Ls.15–21, p.917, Ls.13–17.)
Mr. Raider said that, to retaliate for the stolen marijuana, Mr. Robins had asked Mr. Douglas to
help him “[h]andle the situation.” (Tr., p.916, Ls.18–21; see also Tr., p.896, Ls.3–20, p.901, L.6–
p.902, L.5, p.910, Ls.11–22, p.912, Ls.4–12.)
On May 12, 2014, the State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Winn committed
two counts of aiding and abetting first degree murder, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-204, -4001,
-4002, and -4003(a), one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder, in violation
of I.C. §§ 18-204, -306, -4001, -4002, and -4003(a). (R., pp.21–23.) Following a preliminary
3hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the offenses and bound Mr. Winn over to
district court. (R., pp.78–83, 86, 87–89; see generally Ex., 8/14/2014 Prelim. Hr’g Tr.) The State
filed an Information charging Mr. Winn with two counts of aiding and abetting first degree
murder and one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder. (R., pp.90–92; see
also R., pp.292–94 (Amended Information).) Mr. Winn pled not guilty to the charges. (R., p.98.)
The district court held a five-day jury trial. (See generally Tr., p.137, L.1–p.1287, L.10.)
The jury found Mr. Winn guilty as charged. (Tr., p.1284, L.6–p.1286, L.8; R., p.402.)
Approximately two months later, the district court held a sentencing hearing.
(R., pp.403–04; Tr., p.1294, L.1–p.1340, L.16.) Mr. Winn did not participate in the presentence
investigation report (“PSI”). (See PSI,1 pp.1–15.) The State recommended a fixed life sentence
for both counts of aiding and abetting first degree murder and fifteen years fixed for aiding and
abetting attempted first degree murder. (Tr., p.1310, Ls.8–18.) Mr. Winn recommended an
aggregate sentence for all three counts of life imprisonment, with ten years fixed. (Tr., p.1311,
Ls.4–10.) The district court imposed a life sentence, with forty years fixed, for both counts of
aiding and abetting first degree murder, to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.1337, L.20–p.1338,
L.2.) For aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder, the district court sentenced
Mr. Winn to fifteen years fixed, also to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.1338, Ls.2–4.)
Mr. Winn timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.405–
07, 411–14.)
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 283-page electronic document containing the confidential
exhibits.
4ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Winn to life imprisonment, with
forty years fixed, following his conviction of two counts of aiding and abetting first degree
murder and one count of aiding and abetting attempted first degree murder?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Winn To Life Imprisonment,
With Forty Years Fixed, Following His Conviction Of Two Counts Of Aiding And Abetting
First Degree Murder And One Count Of Aiding And Abetting Attempted First Degree Murder
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the  burden  of  showing  a  clear  abuse  of  discretion  on  the  part  of  the  court  imposing  the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Winn’s aggregate sentence of life imprisonment, with
forty years fixed, does not exceed the statutory maximum. See I.C. § 18-4004 (mandatory
minimum sentence of indeterminate life, with ten years fixed, for first degree murder); I.C. § 18-
306(1) (maximum sentence of fifteen years for attempted first degree murder) Accordingly, to
show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Winn “must show that the sentence, in
light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
5Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Here, Mr. Winn asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district court
should  have  sentenced  him  to  a  lesser  term  of  imprisonment  in  light  of  the  mitigating  factors,
including his remorse for the victims and his lesser culpability of the alleged crimes.
Although Mr. Winn maintained his innocence, his statements at sentencing showed he
felt remorse for the victims of the alleged crimes. Remorse and regret are factors in favor of
mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). At sentencing, Mr. Winn stated, “I do
feel for my friends, my victims. The victims in this case, I feel for my friends.” (Tr., p.1322,
Ls.18–19.) He also appreciated that Mr. Calloway’s and Mr. Bailey’s family “lost a loved one.”
(Tr., p.1333, Ls.6–12.) These statements stand in favor of mitigation, regardless of Mr. Winn’s
repeated denial of any involvement in the shooting.
In  addition  to  his  remorse  for  the  victims,  Mr.  Winn  was  the  least  culpable  actor
compared to other individuals involved with the shooting. For one, Mr. Winn did not shoot
Mr. Calloway, Mr. Bailey, or Ms. Juraska. Mr. Douglas was the principal actor. Nor did
Mr. Winn provide the gun, buy the bullets, or loan the getaway vehicle. That was all done by
Mr. Raider, who received a total sentence of five years fixed. (See Tr., p.945, Ls.3–24, p.1314,
L.24–p.1315, L.12.) Moreover, Mr. Winn was not involved in the dispute between Mr. Robins,
Mr. Bailey, and Mr. Calloway. Mr. Robins, not Mr. Winn, wanted to retaliate for the stolen
marijuana. Mr. Robins, not Mr. Winn, contacted Mr. Douglas. Mr. Robins, not Mr. Winn,
initiated and directed the chain of events that culminated in the shooting. Thus, Mr. Winn’s
6alleged involvement was considerably less than the other three individuals. Yet Mr. Winn
received the same sentence as Mr. Robins, the instigator and ringleader of the crimes. (See
Tr., p.1311, Ls.11–20, p.1336, Ls.2–6.) Mr. Winn submits his lesser culpability warranted a
lesser sentence. In light of these mitigating circumstances, Mr. Winn contends the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Winn respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of
conviction and remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 24th day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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